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INTRODUCTION 
The advocates behind the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) of 
1978 had one very specific mission: to override the Supreme Court’s 
1976 decision in General Electric v. Gilbert,1 in which it had curiously 
held that pregnancy discrimination had nothing to do with gender and 
was thus not a form of actionable sex discrimination under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court was not acting on a blank slate; 
it had used the same reasoning two years earlier to hold, in Geduldig v. 
Aiello,2 that pregnancy discrimination was not sex discrimination for 
equal protection purposes and therefore was not a classification that 
merited heightened judicial scrutiny. But the ruling in Gilbert was more 
than insult to injury. It was both surprising—ignoring a contrary inter-
pretation by the EEOC, as well as rulings of several federal appellate 
courts that had agreed with the EEOC3—and devastating—leaving in 
                                                       
 * Ellen K. Solender Endowed Chair in Women and Law, SMU Dedman School of 
Law. 
 1. 429 U.S. 125, 137–40 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-155, 92 Stat. 2076. 
 2. 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974). 
 3. The Court’s ruling in Gilbert was described as the “one notable exception” to the 
Court’s usual “method of interpretation.”  See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 506 
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens wrote “[w]hen faced with classes of individ-
uals or types of discrimination that fall outside the core prohibitions of anti-discrimination 
statutes, we have consistently construed those statutes to include comparable evils within 
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place the widespread employer policies that kept pregnant women out of 
some jobs altogether, and out of continuous employment at almost every 
job.4 
The response to Gilbert was swift and effective. The Campaign to 
End Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers mobilized support for a 
new law that would amend Title VII, expressly prohibiting pregnancy 
discrimination.5 But the specific mission to obtain a legislative override 
of the Gilbert decision was animated by a more general goal—to ensure 
pregnant women were not left behind as the tide of employee benefits 
and accommodations was rising. The fear of being left behind was firmly 
rooted in reality—workers across the country were benefitting from a 
rising tide of benefits, while pregnancy was being routinely omitted 
from comprehensive benefit plans, and pregnant workers found them-
selves singled out for adverse treatment.6 Employers refused to hire 
pregnant women; forced pregnant employees to stop work at a certain 
point in pregnancy and prevented them from returning to work until a 
certain point after childbirth; and expressly excluded pregnancy from 
otherwise comprehensive insurance, disability and leave policies.7 All 
told, this meant that pregnant women had little hope of reasonable ac-
cess to the workforce, and no hope of full integration into it. 
The PDA was immediately effective in eliminating most formal 
employer policies that singled out pregnancy for different (and typically 
worse) treatment. Congress gave pregnant women the right to be treat-
ed like everyone else—allowed to work if they were fully able to work 
and allowed to take leave if it was otherwise available.8 But these core 
rights, while important, even essential, are not enough to bring about 
true equality for women. Thus, as the PDA approaches forty, we see a 
sustained effort to expand on those core rights.9  In some cases, the “ex-
pansion” is simply a matter of pushing courts to give the PDA its due, 
reading in a way that furthers Congress’s intent rather than under-
mines it. In others, the expansion would go beyond the existing statuto-
ry rights, as necessary to bring about not only women’s access to the 
workplace, but their integration into it. After setting out the core of 
                                                                                                                                
their coverage, even when the particular evil at issue was beyond Congress’ immediate con-
cern in passing the legislation.”  Id. at 505. 
 4. See Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Con-
struction of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 469 (2011). 
 5. See Dinner, supra note 4, at 469–73 (discussing the campaign’s strategy and ef-
fort). 
 6. See Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.  
961, 986–89 (2013). 
 7. This era of workplace policies is explored in detail in Joanna L. Grossman, 
Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J. 567 (2010). 
 8. See id. 609–10. 
 9. See, e.g., Sarah Czypinski, Pregnant Laborers Should Expect Better: The Broken 
Pregnancy Discrimination Standard and How the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act Can Re-
pair It, 76 U. PITT. L. REV. 303 (2014). 
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pregnancy discrimination law, this essay will develop four expansion 
themes: (1) from pregnancy alone to the whole reproductive process, in-
cluding the “maternal wall”; (2) from overt to implicit bias; (3) from sta-
tus to effects (and thus access to accommodation); and (4) from federal to 
state and local protections. 
I. Origins of Pregnancy Discrimination Law 
At the time the Supreme Court was asked to weigh in on the legali-
ty of benefits policies that covered virtually everything but pregnancy, 
there was no positive law against pregnancy discrimination. No stat-
utes. No binding constitutional interpretations. Nor was there any cus-
tom or practice of analogizing pregnancy to conditions with similar ef-
fects on work and providing equal treatment. Quite the contrary. Wom-
en in the workforce encountered a system that openly and perhaps obvi-
ously treated pregnancy as a sui generis condition.10 It was, according to 
the conventional wisdom at the time, like nothing else that workers ex-
perienced.11 Employers thus did not hesitate to construct and apply spe-
cial rules to pregnancy—and even to all women because of their poten-
tial to become pregnant.12 This had been a longstanding practice that 
saw its heyday in the early twentieth century, when the Supreme Court 
upheld an Oregon law that restricted the number of hours women could 
work in laundries in order to protect their “maternal functions” (social 
and biological).13 This ruling left in place a wide variety of state laws 
and employer policies that restricted occupations, job duration, and ben-
efits based on sex, pregnancy, childbirth, childrearing, or some combina-
tion thereof, and fueled new sex- and pregnancy-based laws and policies 
to reinforce women’s maternal role.14 
There was a palpable shift in the early 1970s, when advocates were 
in the process of first challenging, and ultimately dismantling, the sys-
tem of sex-segregation that pervaded not only the workforce, but many 
other facets of society. Although the Supreme Court had been asked 
many times in the preceding century to invalidate laws that relied on 
sex-based classifications, it did so for the first time in 1971.15 And within 
only five years, the Court solidified its suspicion of those classifications 
and its intention to invalidate many, if not all, of them.16 Meanwhile, 
                                                       
 10. See Widiss, supra note 6, at 978–79. 
 11. See id. at 991.  
 12. See SHEILA B. KAMERMAN ET AL., MATERNITY POLICIES AND WORKING WOMEN 5 
(1983). 
 13. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908). 
 14. See Grossman, supra note 7, at 599–600. 
 15. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (requiring that a sex-based classification 
bear a “fair and substantial relation” to a legitimate governmental purpose).  
 16. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (invalidating Alabama law providing 
that only husbands could be ordered to pay alimony); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 
(1976) (invalidating Oklahoma’s sex-based drinking-age law); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
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Title VII was in the process of being put to the test in sex discrimination 
cases at the same time. Although the statute had been enacted in 1968, 
it was not until the 1970s that it was applied in any meaningful way to 
sex discrimination cases.17 Sex neutrality quickly became the rule ra-
ther than the exception, and both legislatures and employers were un-
der pressure to defend any remaining sex-based laws or policies as legit-
imate and defensible rather than an errant relic of the past. 
The proper treatment of pregnancy, however, remained something 
of a mystery to employers, legislatures, and courts. With no obvious 
parallel, it wasn’t immediately clear whether the newfound right of sex 
equality—binding states through the Equal Protection Clause and pri-
vate employers of a certain size through Title VII, in roughly coexten-
sive ways—applied to pregnancy discrimination. Women had begun 
pursuing pregnancy discrimination claims shortly after the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was established in 1965, but 
those claims were met mostly with the same “huh?” that the first sexual 
harassment claims would be a decade later.18 This response was rooted 
more in confusion than resistance and served as an invitation to advo-
cates and academics to provide guidance for developing a theory of 
pregnancy discrimination. With that guidance—and a fair amount of 
pressure—the EEOC drafted and issued its first pregnancy discrimina-
tion guidelines in 1972, taking the position that pregnancy discrimina-
tion is a form of sex discrimination.19 But despite these guidelines, the 
Supreme Court concluded, as discussed above, that Title VII did not 
embrace such a theory (and nor did the Equal Protection Clause).20 In 
Gilbert, the Court upheld a private employer’s disability plan, which 
facially excluded pregnancy from coverage and covered virtually every-
                                                                                                                                
U.S. 677, 678–79 (1973) (invalidating federal law presuming wives of servicemen to be de-
pendent, while requiring husbands of servicewomen to prove dependency in order to earn 
benefits); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971) (striking down Idaho law preferring male 
to female relatives as estate administrators). 
 17. See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991) (invalidating 
employer’s fetal-protection policy, which prohibited non-sterile women from holding jobs 
involving lead exposure in a battery manufacturing plant); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228, 239–40 (1989) (interpreting Title VII to prohibit employment decisions motivated 
by sex-role stereotyping), superseded on other grounds by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 
29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–67 (1986) (establishing 
that sexual harassment is an actionable form of intentional sex discrimination); Phillips v. 
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (establishing the “sex plus” theory of discrimina-
tion that can be used to challenge employment policies or decisions based on sex plus a neu-
tral characteristic). 
 18. Dinner, supra note 4, at 424; see also Deborah Dinner, Strange Bedfellows at 
Work: Neomaternalism in the Making of Sex Discrimination Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 453, 
471–74 (2014). 
 19. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a) (2016). 
 20. 429 U.S. 125, 137–40 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-155, 92 Stat. 2076; Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 
(1974). 
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thing else.21 The Court found no problem with this omission and was 
unpersuaded by Justice Brennan’s point in dissent that it “offends com-
mon sense to suggest . . . that a classification revolving around pregnan-
cy is not, at the minimum, strongly ‘sex related.’”22 
The only bright spot in the early treatment of pregnancy was a 
1974 decision by the Supreme Court that a mandatory stop-work policy 
for pregnant schoolteachers violated the Due Process Clause for its fail-
ure to offer teachers an individualized assessment of their ability to 
work while pregnant.23 In that case, Cleveland Board of Education v. 
LaFleur, decided during the very same term as Geduldig, the Court took 
issue with a policy that forced pregnant teachers on leave early in preg-
nancy and prevented them from returning until at least three months 
after childbirth. 24  The Court drew on the then-emerging, but now-
defunct, irrebuttable presumption doctrine, as well as emerging protec-
tion in the name of “privacy” for decisions related to reproduction.25 But 
it set the stage for a right against stereotyping—public employers, 
whose actions had to comply with the Due Process Clause, could not 
force women out of jobs based on the unproven assumption that preg-
nancy and childbirth would disable all women at the same time and for 
the same length of time.26 
While LaFleur gave public employees protection against at least 
the most egregious types of pregnancy policies, most women had none at 
all. Thus, the more important, and broader, development was the pas-
sage of the PDA. As mentioned at the outset, the PDA specifically over-
ruled Gilbert’s interpretation of Title VII by redefining “sex” to include 
“pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” In the words of a 
Senate Committee report, the Act was designed “to reflect the ‘com-
monsense’ view and to insure that working women are protected against 
all forms of employment discrimination based on sex.”27 
In full, the PDA provides: 
The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ [in Title VII] 
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women 
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions 
                                                       
 21. 429 U.S. 125 at 127.   
 22. Id. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 23. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) 
 24. Id. at 649. 
 25. Id. at 644. 
 26. See id. at 640 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541).  The Court re-
inforced this principle the following year, when, in Turner v. Department of Employment 
Security, it struck down a one-size-fits-all approach to assessing pregnant women’s capacity 
for purposes of administering the unemployment insurance program in Utah.  423 U.S. 44, 46 
(1975) (“It cannot be doubted,” according to the per curiam opinion, “that a substantial num-
ber of women are fully capable of working well into their last trimester of pregnancy and of 
resuming employment shortly after childbirth.”). 
 27. S. Rep. No. 95-331(1977). 
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shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . 
. as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or 
inability to work[. . .]28 
The PDA has always been understood to consist of two clauses, one 
on either side of the semi-colon. The first clause is straightforward be-
cause it maps onto the existing structure of Title VII, which prohibits 
discrimination “because of” an enumerated list of protected characteris-
tics. The PDA simply adds “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions” to the list of those traits on which employment decisions 
cannot be based. Employers are thus prohibited from making employ-
ment decisions on the basis of pregnancy unless they can articulate and 
prove non-pregnancy is a bona fide occupational qualification. 29  The 
purpose of this clause was clear—to prohibit employment policies that 
treated all pregnant women as an undifferentiated group and ignored 
their individual experience with pregnancy. The casual assumption 
“that women will become pregnant and leave the labor market,” the 
Senate Committee observed, “is at the core of the sex stereotyping re-
sulting in unfavorable disparate treatment of women in the work-
place.”30 Moreover, the report continued, those policies rooted on stereo-
types about pregnancy “have long-term effects upon the careers of wom-
en and account in large part for the fact that women remain today pri-
marily in low-paying, dead-end jobs.”31 With a more explicit focus on 
stereotypes, the First Clause invalidated the same types of practices 
thrown into question by LaFleur. But its scope was much broader, 
reaching employment decisions motivated by animus or hostility to 
pregnant workers, as well as those neutral practices that had a dispar-
ate impact on pregnant workers. 
The Second Clause of the PDA has always been more difficult to en-
force. One problem is that it is not modeled on any other provision in a 
federal anti-discrimination law; thus, there are no analogies to be drawn 
when courts are asked to interpret the clause. The Second Clause pro-
vides that women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions “shall be treated the same for all employment-related pur-
poses . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or 
inability to work[…]”32 The Second Clause provoked one primary battle 
in courts in its early years: what does it mean to treat pregnant women 
“the same as” other temporarily disabled workers? More specifically, the 
query was whether the state could mandate, or employers could choose 
                                                       
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
 29. Deborah R. Brake, On Not “Having it Both Ways” and Still Losing: Reflecting on 
Fifty Years of Pregnancy Litigation Under Title VII, 95 B.U. L. REV. 995, 998-1000 (2015).  
First-clause claims can be proven using any of the available methods of proof under Title 
VII—formal policy; mixed-motive or pretext analysis for individual disparate treatment; 
pattern and practice; or disparate impact. See id. 
 30. S. Rep. No. 95-331, supra note 27, at 40. 
 31. Id. at 43. 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). 
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to provide, benefits for pregnancy that were not provided to workers 
with comparable restrictions from another cause. Even feminists could 
not agree about the answer to this question, with some arguing for an 
equal treatment standard that defined the second-wave feminist move-
ment33 and others for an accommodation standard. The equal treatment 
advocates preferred an approach that would minimize harmful stereo-
typing, even at the cost of potentially losing some maternity benefits.34 
The accommodation group pushed for substantive equality—a focus on 
the outcomes necessary to allow women and men to maintain an equal 
engagement with work despite their differing roles in the reproductive 
process.35 When the dispute reached the Supreme Court, it sided with 
the accommodation group, holding, in California Federal Savings & 
Loan v. Guerra, that California could require employers to provide six-
teen weeks of unpaid pregnancy leave whether or not they provided the 
same benefit to comparably disabled workers.36  Although Guerra re-
solved the first dispute about the Second Clause, it had little to say 
about the one that would come next: whether the woman fully or par-
tially disabled by pregnancy was entitled to the accommodations re-
ceived by any other worker, by all other workers, or by a sufficient num-
ber of other workers? This dispute, explored in section C below, would 
provoke courts battles spanning almost two decades.37 
II. Changing the Dimensions 
With the PDA came the immediate invalidation of routine employer 
policies (and, in some cases, state laws) that had always singled out 
pregnancy for special treatment—sometimes better, but typically worse. 
That shift was monumental, opening doors to the workplace for women 
despite their experiences with pregnancy and childbirth. But, as many 
disadvantaged groups have found, opening doors is the beginning rather 
than the end of the battle. In this section, I will discuss four key shifts 
                                                       
 33. For a long list of equal-treatment based victories, see Equal Pay Act of 1963, 
Pub. L. No. 88-38, 52 Stat. 1062 (1963).  (equal pay for equal work); Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, 68A Stat. 165 (1964) (protection from sex-
based employment discrimination); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
No. 92-318, Title IX, 86 Stat. 1043 (1972)  (protection from sex-based discrimination by edu-
cational institutions). Additionally, see cases cited in notes 16 and 17, supra. 
 34. See, e.g., Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, 
Courts, and Feminism, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 151 (1992); Wendy Williams, Equality’s 
Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. L. REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 325 (1985). 
 35. See, e.g., Linda Krieger & Patricia Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal 
Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women’s Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV.  513, 537–57 (1983); Ann Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L. J. 375, 
426–30 (1981). 
 36. 479 U.S. 272 (1987). 
 37. See infra Section C.  
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in pregnancy discrimination law—successful and unsuccessful, complet-
ed and still ongoing—that signal a move from access to integration. 
A. Expanding the Definition of Pregnancy 
Whether pregnancy discrimination law adequately protects wom-
en’s ability to participate in the workforce on the same terms as men 
who choose to have children turns in part on the definition of pregnan-
cy—and pregnancy discrimination. The PDA extends to “pregnancy, 
childbirth, and related medical conditions,”38 a phrase chosen, according 
to the Senate Report, to reflect those “physiological occurrences peculiar 
to women.”39 But of course being pregnant is just one aspect of the re-
productive process that is experienced only by women. Only women use 
prescription contraceptives; only women utilize surgical impregnation 
procedures; and only women lactate. Each of these things has physical 
effects that can, depending on the particular woman and her particular 
job, pose conflicts with job performance. Cases challenging employment 
policies that relate to contraception, infertility and lactation have forced 
courts to consider the entire reproductive process and how much of it is 
protected by existing law. As some illustrative examples below make 
clear, the law is often read broadly when it comes to protecting status—
preventing employers from punishing a woman for seeking fertility 
treatment or for pumping breastmilk, for example—but narrowly when 
the effects of the reproductive process might necessitate some accommo-
dation. What follows is not an exhaustive discussion of the law of con-
traceptive coverage, infertility, or lactation, but rather some highlights 
that reveal this tension, as well as the limits of an antidiscrimination 
lens for protecting the outer edges of the reproductive process. 
There were several lawsuits in the 2000s in which women chal-
lenged the exclusion of contraceptive coverage from employer-provided 
health insurance plans. In most of these cases, the employer provided an 
otherwise comprehensive plan, with coverage for prescription drugs and 
devices.40 Is the omission of contraception from coverage sex or pregnan-
cy discrimination? The class of prescription drugs and devices currently 
available to prevent pregnancy—birth control pills, Depo Provera, in-
trauterine devices (IUDs), and implantable contraceptives, to name the 
most common ones—are exclusively used by women.41 And the lack of 
insurance coverage thus only hurts women—and poor women, most of 
                                                       
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
 39. S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 4 (1977). 
 40. See, e.g., Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001); 
see also Mauldin v. Wal-Mart Stores, 89 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1600 (N.D. Ga. 2002); 
Glaubach v. Regence Blueshield, 149 Wash. 2d 827 (Wash. 2003); Alexander v. Am. Airlines, 
Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7089 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2002). 
 41. See GUTTMACHER INST., CONTRACEPTIVE USE IN THE UNITED STATES (Oct. 
2015); KIMBERLY DANIELS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CURRENT 
CONTRACEPTIVE STATUS AMONG WOMEN AGED 15-44: UNITED STATES, 2011-2013 (Dec. 2014). 
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all.42 In addition to incurring costs for contraception, the lack of cover-
age increases the chance of an unplanned pregnancy, a consequence 
that imposes disproportionate and unique burdens on women.43 For the-
se reasons, contraceptive access thus figured prominently on the agenda 
for women's rights advocacy during the first decade of the millennium. 
As a result of many months of pressure from public interest organi-
zations, the EEOC issued a ruling, in 2000, on insurance coverage for 
contraception.44 In 1999, a conglomerate of public interest organizations 
representing those and other interests requested that the EEOC issue a 
policy guidance taking a position on insurance coverage for contracep-
tion.45 The EEOC declined, but instead expressed its viewed through the 
adjudication of an individual case.46 The EEOC concluded that a contra-
ceptive exclusion constitutes a form of pregnancy discrimination.47 At 
the time of this ruling, most women did not have insurance coverage for 
birth control.48 Indeed, studies estimated that two-thirds of large group 
insurance plans did not provide any coverage for oral contraceptives, the 
most commonly used reversible method of birth control, and nearly half 
did not cover any prescription contraceptive drug or device. 49  Many 
plans did (and still do) cover surgical sterilization for both men and 
women.50 
Before the EEOC decision, there were no court rulings addressing 
the legality of such exclusions. There were some federal and state laws 
governing coverage of prescription contraceptives in insurance plans, 
however. Since 1998, health plans participating in the Federal Employ-
ees Health Benefit Program have been required to provide prescription 
                                                       
 42. See generally GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, INSURANCE COVERAGE OF 
CONTRACEPTIVES (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_ICC.pdf  
(analyzing state contraceptive coverage mandates). 
 43. See generally INST. OF MEDICINE, THE BEST INTENTIONS: UNINTENDED 
PREGNANCY AND THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 50–80 (Sarah S. Brown et al. 
eds. 1995).  
 44. EEOC, Commission Decision on Coverage of Contraception (Dec. 14, 2000), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception.html. 
 45. Laura Meckler, Women’s Groups Ask EEOC to Force Coverage of Birth Control, 
CHI. TRIB., July 7, 1999, § 8.  
 46. EEOC Decision on Coverage of Contraception, September 19, 2001, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception.html. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 
WASH. L. REV. 363, 368–69 (1998); Alissa J. Rubin, Include Birth Control in Health Plan, 
EEOC Says, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2000) (“Although most health plans now cover prescription 
drugs, relatively few include comprehensive coverage for birth control pills and other pre-
scription contraceptives.”). 
 49. Law, supra note 48, at 369–70. 
 50. See id.; GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: INSURANCE 
COVERAGE OF CONTRACEPTIVES (May 1, 2016); GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, UNEVEN & 
UNEQUAL: INSURANCE COVERAGE AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES 9 (1995) (finding 
that on average, 86% of insurance plans cover all forms of surgical sterilization and 90% of 
point-of-service networks cover both male and female sterilization). 
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contraceptive coverage if other prescription drugs are covered.51 Begin-
ning with Maryland in 1998, twenty-eight states adopted some type of 
mandated benefit law for prescription contraceptives.52 These state laws 
were met with opposition from those who complain that the increase in 
the cost of insurance (although it is negligible) and those who object to 
forced participation in an insurance plan that reimburses for contracep-
tion or abortion, which they oppose.53 Even without opposition, mandat-
ed benefit laws have inherent limits. First, ERISA, a federal law regu-
lating pensions and other employment benefits, preempts state man-
dates for self-insured employers.54 As a result, nearly half of all employ-
ees are not protected by any state law requiring that birth control be 
covered.55 Second, most state mandates apply only to group plans, not 
individually purchased policies.56 That further reduces the number of 
people protected by the legislation.57 Federal legislators tried for years 
to enact The Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Cover-
age Act, but those efforts never succeeded.58 
Why does the exclusion of contraceptives from an insurance plan 
constitute pregnancy discrimination? The PDA, as we have seen, defines 
sex discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of “pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions.”59 The non-discrimination rule 
applies to all aspects of employment including, the Supreme Court held 
in an early case interpreting the PDA, the doling out of benefits like in-
surance.60 To reach the result it did, the EEOC had to establish two 
things: first, that a classification based on contraception is a classifica-
tion based on pregnancy; and second, that the insurance plans at issue 
impose unequal (and therefore unlawful) treatment on the basis of 
pregnancy. 
                                                       
 51. See Treasury and General Government Appropriation Act, S. 2312, 105th Cong. 
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The first of these hurdles might seem like a stretch, in that it re-
quires one to believe that being pregnant and avoiding being pregnant 
are both forms of pregnancy discrimination. But the Supreme Court 
read the PDA broadly in UAW v. Johnson Controls, in which it held that 
the PDA prohibits discrimination not only on the basis of pregnancy it-
self, but also on the basis of potential pregnancy.61 In this case, the 
Court considered a challenge to the validity of an employer’s so-called 
“fetal protection” policy that prohibited fertile women from holding jobs 
in a battery manufacturing plant that involved exposure to lead.62 Be-
fore the enactment of Title VII in 1964, Johnson Controls had excluded 
women completely from battery-manufacturing jobs.63 It then began to 
hire women into these jobs with, after 1977, a stern warning about the 
possible dangers of lead exposure to an unborn child.64 In 1982, howev-
er, Johnson Controls shifted its policy again to exclude “women who are 
pregnant or who are capable of bearing children” from all jobs involving 
lead exposure, as well as all jobs in which they could bid, bump, trans-
fer, or be promoted into a job with lead exposure. 65  A woman was 
deemed “capable of bearing children” unless her “inability to bear chil-
dren [was] medically documented.”66 The policy was challenged by a va-
riety of plaintiffs, including a woman who chose to be sterilized rather 
than lose her job, a 50-year-old woman who was transferred to a lower-
paying job with no lead exposure against her will, and a man whose re-
quest to transfer out of a lead-exposure job because he wanted to start a 
family was denied.67 
A threshold issue in the case was whether the company’s policy 
constituted facial sex discrimination.68 If so, it could only be justified 
under the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense, rather 
than under the more lenient “business” necessity defense to policies 
with disparate impact or only upon a finding of pretext.69 The Court had 
no trouble concluding that the policy was facially discriminatory be-
cause it “classifies on the basis of gender and childbearing capacity, ra-
ther than fertility alone.”70 Despite evidence of risks to the unborn chil-
dren of men exposed to dangerous levels of lead, the company “requires 
only a female employee to produce proof that she is not capable of repro-
                                                       
 61. EEOC, COMMISSION DECISION ON COVERAGE OF CONTRACEPTION, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception.html (Dec. 14, 2000). 
 62. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 190 (1991). 
 63. Id. at 191. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 191–92. 
 66. Id. at 191–92. 
 67. Id. at 192.  
 68. Id. at 198. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 198. 
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ducing.”71 This type of “sex-plus” policy had been ruled in a prior case to 
be no better than a policy that distinguished all women from all men.72 
Johnson Controls further argued that its facially discriminatory 
policy was nonetheless sex neutral because it did not exclude all women 
and was not motivated by animus towards women.73 But the Court dis-
pensed with that argument quickly.74 The policy “is not neutral because 
it does not apply to the reproductive capacity of the company’s male em-
ployees in the same way as it applies to that of the females.”75 Moreover, 
the Court continued, “the absence of a malevolent motive does not con-
vert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discrim-
inatory effect.”76 The illegality of facial discrimination “does not depend 
on why the employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of 
the discrimination.”77 
The Court’s conclusion that the policy constituted facial sex dis-
crimination was “bolstered” by the PDA, which also disallows classifica-
tions on the basis of “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions.”78 Discrimination “based on a woman’s pregnancy is, on its face, 
discrimination because of her sex.”79 The company’s policy, which explic-
itly classified “on the basis of potential for pregnancy . . . must be re-
garded, for Title VII purposes, in the same light as explicit sex discrimi-
nation.”80 
Once the Court concluded that the policy was facially discriminato-
ry, the burden shifted to the company to prove it was justified as a 
BFOQ—in other words, that sterility in female employees was “reason-
ably necessary” to the “normal operation” of business.81 Other cases had 
recognized a safety exception, under which a class of workers could be 
deemed unqualified if they created danger to others.82 The exclusion of 
female guards from an especially dangerous area of a maximum-security 
men’s prison was justified in this vein because the presence of female 
guards might provoke assaults and undermine the general security of 
the prison.83 Johnson Controls argued that the “safety exception” was 
broad enough to encompass risk to the unborn child of a female work-
                                                       
 71. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198.  
 72. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (invalidating 
hiring policy that excluded women, but not men, with preschool-age children).  On the wom-
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 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 198–99. 
 79. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 199. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 200.  
 82. See generally Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
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er.84 But the Court rejected that argument, holding that it was not even 
broad enough to include risk to the woman herself.85 Risk to an employ-
ee is something to be weighed by the individual when deciding whether 
to accept a job.86 And while the safety exception may be broad enough to 
protect some third parties, it extends only to those who “were indispen-
sable to the particular business at issue.”87 
The Court’s reasoning in Johnson Controls is protective of women’s 
workplace equality and further noted that the BFOQ defense operates 
no differently for pregnancy than it does for sex.88 It read the Second 
Clause as “contain[ing] a BFOQ standard of its own: Unless pregnant 
employees differ from others ‘in their ability or inability to work,’ they 
must be ‘treated the same’ as other employees ‘for all employment-
related purposes.’”89 And this applies to women who are “either preg-
nant or potentially pregnant;” “women as capable of doing their jobs as 
their male counterparts may not be forced to choose between having a 
child and having a job.”90 The legislative history of the PDA mandates 
this lens. The congressional reports “indicate that this statutory stand-
ard was chosen to protect female workers from being treated differently 
from other employees simply because of their capacity to bear chil-
dren.” 91 As the Senate report concludes, “the treatment of pregnant 
women in covered employment must focus not on their condition alone 
but on the actual effects of that condition on their ability to work. Preg-
nant women who are able to work must be permitted to work on the 
same conditions as other employees. . . .”92 
Let’s return, then, to the EEOC’s reasoning about the illegality of 
excluding prescription contraceptives from an otherwise comprehensive 
insurance plan. The EEOC relied on Johnson Controls to conclude that 
contraception was covered by the PDA.93 Employers cannot discriminate 
against women who exercise control over reproduction—and thus cannot 
omit coverage for contraceptive care while providing coverage for virtu-
ally everything else.94 That is a pregnancy-based classification, under 
                                                       
 84. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 202.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 202.  The Court distinguished a bizarre set of lower court cases upholding 
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the Johnson Controls interpretation of the PDA.95 Moreover, it is one 
that denies equal treatment to women on the basis of pregnancy.96 In 
the individual case before it, the EEOC examined the other insurance 
benefits offered by those two particular employers, to see whether the 
plans in question singled out pregnancy for disadvantageous treat-
ment.97 The comparison the EEOC drew was between prescription con-
traceptives, which were excluded from the plans, and other prescription 
drugs designed to prevent rather than cure disease, which the plans 
covered. 98  Because the plans covered vaccinations, preventive dental 
care, and a variety of drugs to prevent the development of certain medi-
cal conditions, the EEOC found that women were being denied equal 
treatment.99 
Six months after the EEOC ruled, a federal district court in the 
State of Washington reached the same conclusion as the EEOC.100 In 
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., a federal district court held that employer-
based insurance plans had to cover prescription contraceptives to com-
ply with Title VII. 101  In Erickson, the district court noted that 
“[a]lthough the plan covers almost all drugs and devices used by men, 
the exclusion of prescription contraceptives creates a gaping hole in the 
coverage offered to female employees, leaving a fundamental and imme-
diate healthcare need uncovered . . . Title VII requires employers to rec-
ognize the differences between the sexes and provide equally compre-
hensive coverage, even if that means providing additional benefits to 
cover women-only expenses.”102 
As more litigation unfolded, however, the legal landscape became 
more mixed. Other district courts have split on whether such exclusions 
constitute unlawful discrimination under Title VII, as amended by the 
PDA.103 Only one federal appellate court has considered this issue, but it 
rejected the EEOC’s conclusion.104 The Eighth Circuit, in Standridge v. 
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Union Pacific Railroad Company, held that it was neither pregnancy 
nor sex discrimination for the employer to exclude coverage for all forms 
of contraception, including sterilization.105 The court concluded that con-
traception is not a “related medical condition” under the terms of the 
PDA, despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in Johnson Controls that “po-
tential pregnancy” is covered by that same language.106 The Standridge 
court focused instead on a line in Johnson Controls that the employer’s 
hiring ban was not based on “fertility alone.”107 In context, however, that 
line was distinguishing fertility, which can affect men or women, from 
potential pregnancy, which affects only women. For prescription contra-
ception, which is used only by women, “potential pregnancy” is the bet-
ter analogy. The court in Standridge found the EEOC’s adjudication 
“unpersuasive.”108 It also concluded that the employer’s plan was gen-
der-neutral because it excluded coverage for male contraception (con-
doms), which are non-prescription, and sterilization.109 
The impact of these rulings both for and against contraceptive eq-
uity has lessened dramatically over the last decade, as the number of 
employers providing insurance with contraceptive benefits has dramati-
cally increased. By 2010, nine in ten employer-provided insurance plans 
covered prescription contraceptives, compared with only three in ten a 
decade earlier.110 This change came about primarily through state adop-
tion of contraceptive coverage mandates, though with it a change in 
common employer practices. But the landscape has changed more dra-
matically still with the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and 
the recommendation by the Institute of Medicine that certain preventa-
tive services, including contraceptive care, should be provided to insured 
patients at no cost.111 The new DHHS regulations contain a narrow ex-
ception for certain religious employers, and some plans are at least tem-
porarily “grandfathered” and permitted to maintain existing exclu-
sions.112 The initial fight over how broadly to draft the exemption pales 
in comparison to the aftermath. The contraceptive care provision has 
been subject to repeated attacks, as religious organizations have argued 
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that they have a religious freedom interest strong enough to outweigh 
the government’s reason for mandating coverage.113 In Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court held, surprisingly, that closely-
held corporations could not be forced to provide insurance coverage for 
contraceptives if doing would violate the sincere religious beliefs of their 
owners.114  An even greater expansion of the religious-freedom exemp-
tion is under review in the October 2015 term of the Supreme Court; 
several consolidated cases raise the question whether a religiously affil-
iated non-profit organization is protected under the federal Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, even from filling out the form necessary to opt 
out of the mandate to provide insurance coverage for contraceptive ser-
vices.115 Given Hobby Lobby and efforts to extend the religious exemp-
tion even further, and the Court’s utter failure to consider that an ex-
pansive interpretation of the religious exemption might hinder women’s 
equality, it remains important to consider access to contraceptive care 
as a facet of women’s workplace equality.116 
A second challenge to the definition of “pregnancy discrimination” 
relates to infertility treatment—insurance coverage for the procedures 
and the treatment of the working women who undergo them. The ques-
tions here may prove more important than those about contraceptive 
access since there is no equivalent federal mandate here.117 Whether the 
PDA protects against infertility discrimination has arisen in two con-
texts: challenges to insurance plans that do not cover infertility treat-
ment, such as in vitro fertilization; and challenges to adverse employ-
ment decisions taken against a woman because she is undergoing 
treatment for infertility. 
More than 7 million Americans struggle with infertility (the inabil-
ity to conceive a child after 12 months of unprotected intercourse) or 
“impaired fecundity” (the inability to conceive and carry a child to 
term). 118   Roughly six percent of married women ages 15-44 (the 
childbearing years, in demographic terms) are affected.119 With advanc-
es in reproductive technology, there are many more options for treating 
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infertility or preventing miscarriage. Twelve percent of women of 
childbearing age have sought medical help for infertility or prevention of 
miscarriage.120 Because most treatments for infertility are expensive, 
prohibitively so for many women, insurance coverage is an important 
issue. About forty percent of the time, the cause of infertility is attribut-
able to a male factor, forty percent to a female factor, and twenty per-
cent to a “couple factor” (such as an incompatibility between the male 
and female) or to some unknown factor.121 Less than half of those who 
are infertile seek treatment, and cost is a significant factor for those 
who forego it.122 The cost of fertility treatments is staggering. For in-
stance, a single round of IVF can cost up to $12,400, and the procedure 
may have to be repeated several times before pregnancy is achieved.123 
Insurance coverage for infertility varies tremendously. According to a 
1996 survey, about 40 percent of large employers covered some form of 
advanced fertility treatment, like IVF. But only nineteen percent of 
HMOs paid for IVF, and some large insurance plans have stopped cover-
ing such treatments in recent years because of the cost and increasing 
demand. About a third of the states require health plans to provide cov-
erage for at least some fertility treatments.124 New York, for example, 
requires insurers to cover infertility drug treatments, as long as they 
cover prescription drugs generally, and surgeries or treatments de-
signed to correct a problem creating infertility. But it does not require 
coverage of the more expensive procedures like IVF.125 
The rising demand for reproductive technology and the still-
prohibitive costs have led to litigation over whether employers can omit 
coverage for surgical impregnation procedures from otherwise compre-
hensive insurance plans without running afoul of Title VII, as amended 
by the PDA. Litigation over insurance coverage for infertility treatment 
has been largely unsuccessful. In Saks v. Franklin Covey Co.,126 the Se-
cond Circuit held that an employer can deny insurance coverage for in-
fertility procedures done only to women without committing sex or 
pregnancy discrimination. Doing so, accordingly to the court, constitutes 
neither pregnancy nor sex discrimination. This decision was the first 
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appellate ruling on an issue that had been brewing in lower courts. The 
court upheld the plan despite the fact that it covered penile implants 
and surgery to correct conditions causing infertility. Rochelle Saks ar-
gued that the plan’s failure to reimburse her for IVF violated the PDA. 
The court rejected her argument, concluding that the PDA does not ex-
tend to infertility. 127  Both sexes, it noted, suffer from infertility, in 
roughly equal proportion, while pregnancy affects only women. Thus 
discrimination on the basis of infertility, the court held, does not consti-
tute unlawful pregnancy discrimination.128 
The Saks court’s ruling on this point is in some tension with the 
Supreme Court's ruling in Johnson Controls. That case said it is preg-
nancy discrimination to impose an employment rule that turns on a 
woman's child-bearing capacity.129 But Saks’ insurance plan does that: it 
excludes coverage to some women based on their child-bearing capaci-
ty.130 Under Johnson Controls, that is arguably a form of pregnancy dis-
crimination.131 Discrimination based on female infertility may be con-
ceptualized as pregnancy discrimination for a simple reason: for the 
women who must undergo it, the treatment is a necessary part of the 
process of achieving pregnancy.132 
In Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals also held that infertility is not a “related medical con-
dition” under the PDA because both men and women can suffer from 
it.133 It is thus unlike the “potential pregnancy” recognized in Johnson 
Controls, which is unique to women.134 
Although courts have been reluctant to view infertility treatment 
as covered by the PDA in insurance coverage cases, some have taken a 
more expansive view when considering cases in which a woman has 
been fired for undergoing fertility treatments. As with pregnancy, there 
is no inherent conflict between undergoing treatment for infertility and 
engaging in paid work.135 But infertility treatment can be intermittently 
time-consuming and physically challenging. For instance, IVF, an in-
creasingly common procedure, requires a difficult series of procedures 
and injections that will require most, if not all women to take time off 
from work. Many will also suffer side effects from IVF drugs or the pro-
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cedures that may interfere with a woman's full working capacity on a 
temporary basis.136 
Two federal courts have ruled that discriminating against a woman 
because she is undergoing fertility treatment violates the PDA. As one 
federal district court explained, in Pacourek v. Inland Steel, 
The basic theory of the PDA may be simply stated: Only women 
can become pregnant; stereotypes based on pregnancy and re-
lated medical conditions have been a barrier to women's econom-
ic advancement; and classifications based on pregnancy and re-
lated medical conditions are never gender-neutral. Discrimina-
tion against an employee because she intends to, is trying to, or 
simply has the potential to become pregnant is therefore illegal 
discrimination. It makes sense to conclude that the PDA was in-
tended to cover a woman's intention or potential to become 
pregnant, because all that conclusion means is that discrimina-
tion against persons who intend to or can potentially become 
pregnant is discrimination against women, which is the kind of 
truism the PDA wrote into law. It makes sense to conclude that 
the PDA was intended to cover a woman's intention or potential 
to become pregnant, because all that conclusion means is that 
discrimination against persons who intend to or can potentially 
become pregnant is discrimination against women, which is the 
kind of truism the PDA wrote into law.137 
The court viewed Johnson Controls as dispositive on the scope of the 
PDA—classifications on the basis of either pregnancy or potential preg-
nancy constitute facial pregnancy discrimination.138 Moreover, the ina-
bility to become pregnant naturally is a “related medical condition” that 
also qualifies the plaintiff for statutory protection.139 
The Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Hall v. Nalco, 
ruling that an employer could not fire an employee for undergoing in 
vitro fertilization.140 Cheryl Hall required leave from work while under-
going in vitro fertilization; she took a month-long leave of absence in 
March 2003.141 She did not become pregnant through that round of IVF 
and requested a second leave of absence in August 2003.142 Before she 
was scheduled to begin the second leave, however, her supervisor in-
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formed her that the company was reorganizing and retaining only one of 
the two people with her title, and she was terminated.143 
Hall alleged that her firing was in violation of the PDA.144 She al-
leges that her supervisor told another supervisor that Hall had “missed 
a lot of work due to health” and wrote “absenteeism-infertility treat-
ments” on her performance review.145 She also noted that the employee 
who kept the remaining position of the original two was a woman who is 
incapable of having children. 146  The district court granted summary 
judgment to Hall's employer on the ground that “infertile women” are 
not a protected class under Title VII.147 Because both men and women 
can experience infertility, the court reasoned, it is a gender-neutral con-
dition.148 The Seventh Circuit rejected this reasoning as inconsistent 
with Johnson Controls, which made clear that the PDA is not limited to 
women who are already pregnant.149 And even though both men and 
women can experience infertility, only women will undergo assisted re-
productive procedures to become pregnant.150 Thus, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded, Hall, if her allegations are true, “was terminated not for the 
gender-neutral condition of infertility, but rather for the gender-specific 
quality of childbearing capacity.”151 On remand, Hall had to prove that 
she was fired not simply for absenteeism, but because her absenteeism 
was caused by infertility treatments.152 The first and second sets of cases 
are not necessarily inconsistent. Courts can be seen as protecting 
against status discrimination, but not requiring accommodation of the 
effects of infertility. As discussed in Part II.c below, this is similar to the 
tack many courts have taken on pregnancy itself. 
The third challenge to the definition of “pregnancy” relates to lacta-
tion discrimination. If an employer fires an employee for breastfeeding, 
is that a violation of the PDA? One recent case is illustrative of the prob-
lem of lactation discrimination, as well as the consequences of excluding 
it from protection under the PDA.153 In EEOC v. Houston Funding, Inc., 
a federal district court ruled that lactation discrimination is not action-
able under Title VII or the PDA because it does not qualify as a “related 
medical condition.”154 The plaintiff, Donnicia Venters, took a leave of 
absence to give birth.155 A few days afterwards, she spoke with the com-
                                                       
143. Id. at 645–46. 
144. Id. at 646. 
145. Id. 
146. Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 2008). 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 645. 
149. Id. at 647. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 649. 
152. Hall, 534 F.3d at 649. 
153. See EEOC v. Houston Funding II, Ltd., 717 F.3d 425,425 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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pany’s vice president about her plans for returning to work.156 She said 
she didn’t know and was waiting for advice from her doctor.157 Two 
months after she started her unpaid leave, the company allegedly decid-
ed to fire her.158 But before she was informed of the decision, she called 
to say she was ready to return to work—and to ask if she could use a 
back room to pump breastmilk once she returned.159 She was then told 
she had been replaced.160 The EEOC sued on her behalf, claiming that 
she had been fired because she wanted to pump breastmilk at work.161 
However, the federal district judge who heard Venters’s case ruled that 
even if Venters was right that the company had, indeed, fired her be-
cause of her request to pump breast milk, firing her for that reason was 
not a legally actionable form of discrimination.162 “The law,” the judge 
wrote, “does not punish lactation discrimination” because it is not a “re-
lated medical condition” of pregnancy.163 The EEOC also contended, on 
Venters’s behalf, that to fire Venters had constituted sex discrimina-
tion.164 But the judge deemed that argument worthy of but a single, con-
clusory sentence: “[f]iring someone because of lactation or breast-
pumping is not sex discrimination.”165 
Venters alleged not that she was refused time or space to pump 
breast milk, but that she was fired for even asking to pump breast milk 
at work. The judge in that case rejected her pregnancy discrimination 
claim, offering the following reasoning: 
“Discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth, or a related med-
ical condition is illegal. Related conditions may include cramping, dizzi-
ness, and nausea while pregnant. Even if the company’s claim that 
[Venters] was fired for abandonment is meant to hide the real reason – 
she wanted to pump breast milk – lactation is not pregnancy, childbirth, 
or a related medical condition. She gave birth on December 11, 2009. 
“After that day, she was no longer pregnant and her pregnancy-related 
conditions ended.”166 
This reasoning is scientifically and logically suspect, and it is illogi-
cal to suggest that a woman who suffers any number of childbirth-
related complications is not protected by the PDA if those complications 
happened to occur after, rather than before, the birth. On appeal, the 
Fifth Circuit acknowledged the fallacies in the lower court’s opinion, 
                                                       
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 427. 
158. Id. at 426. 
159. Houston Funding II, Ltd., 717 F.3d at 426.  
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161. EEOC v. Houston Funding II, Ltd., No. H-11-2442, 2012 WL 739494, 2 (S.D. Tx. 
Feb. 2, 2012). 
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observing that “lactation is a related medical condition of pregnancy for 
purposes of the PDA. Lactation is the physiological process of secreting 
milk from mammary glands and is directly caused by hormonal changes 
associated with pregnancy and childbirth.”167  Judge Edith Jones con-
curred, but wrote separately to emphasize that the PDA did not guaran-
tee the plaintiff any accommodation for lactation.168 If her complaint was 
that she was denied “special facilities or down time during work to 
pump or ‘express’ breast milk,” she would have no protection.169 As with 
the cases on infertility, we see the distinction between status (protected) 
and effects (not protected) and the possibility that discrimination law 
cannot be marshaled to provide otherwise. As with contraceptive care, 
the ACA ameliorates this problem to a degree, requiring that hourly 
workers be provided regular breaks and a space other than a restroom 
to express breastmilk.170 
Together, the cases on contraception, infertility, and lactation re-
veal a legal regime that has expanded to protect the status-based rights 
associated with reproduction—understanding pregnancy to be the mid-
dle of a process with earlier and later points.  But even under this ex-
panded definition of pregnancy, courts have remained largely insensi-
tive to the effects of the reproductive process, felt uniquely by women. 
Part II.c, below, takes up the weak, but recently bolstered, right of com-
parative accommodation under the PDA, which makes it easier for some 
women to stay in role throughout the reproductive process. 
B. Expanding the Understanding of Pregnancy Bias 
A second shift, reflected more in research and commentary than in 
case law, revolves around our understanding of pregnancy bias—those 
attitudes, beliefs, and stereotypes that lead employers to take actions 
against pregnant workers that punish them or restrict their opportuni-
ties unnecessarily. 
Our collective attitudes towards pregnancy do not explain the ram-
pant and damaging pregnancy discrimination that workers experience. 
As Iris Marion Young described pregnancy, it is: 
 
[A] time of quiet waiting. We refer to the woman as ‘ex-
pecting,’ as though this new life were flying in from an-
other planet and she sat in her rocking chair by the win-
dow, occasionally moving the curtain aside to see wheth-
                                                       
167. Houston Funding II, Ltd., 717 F.3d at 428.  
168. Id. at 430–31. 
169. Id. at 430 (Jones, J., concurring).  For analysis and discussion of lactation dis-
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er the ship is coming . . . . [P]regnancy is primarily a 
time of waiting and watching, when nothing happens.”171  
 
But this perception of pregnancy poses an inherent conflict for 
women who work—watchful waiting is replaced by active, even strenu-
ous, engagement. The gap in expectations for pregnant women and the 
behavior of the pregnant working woman can be troubling. And what we 
see in many cases of pregnancy discrimination is not animus towards 
the pregnant woman per se, but a reflection of cultural ambivalence 
about pregnant women at work.172 This ambivalence rears its head in 
many places, but let’s focus here on the research that objectively sup-
ports its existence. 
Social science research supports the notion that ambivalent reac-
tions to a woman’s working while pregnant translate into animus and 
adverse employment actions.173 One study, for example, found deeply 
contrasting reactions by retail employees to pregnant customers versus 
pregnant job applicants.174 Pregnant customers were greeted with affec-
tionate and benevolent responses, sometimes with affirming (if perhaps 
annoying) touches and diminutives (“honey” and “sweetie”).175 Pregnant 
job applicants, by contrast, faced open hostility.176 And this hostility in-
creased, according to a follow-up study, for traditionally male-dominated 
jobs.177 The results reveal ambivalent reactions to pregnant women and 
find that these reactions are situational and role-dependent. Other stud-
ies have found that pregnant women are routinely rated as less compe-
tent and less deserving of promotion than their non-pregnant counter-
parts; these judgments have tangible effects like fewer recommenda-
tions to hire and lower salary recommendations.178 Pregnant women 
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perceive these antipathies and try to avoid them through, among other 
techniques, “pregnant presenteeism,” which drives them to present 
themselves as healthy and able to work, even when they are sick.179 
Stepping back from the studies documenting a very tangible type of 
pregnancy bias, we can explore the robustly documented motherhood 
penalty for women workers. This penalty, which is both consistently 
found and widespread, significantly impairs women’s chances for work-
place equality. It takes several different forms. Researchers in one 
study, for example, found that when subjects received a pair of resumes 
featuring equally qualified applicants of the same gender and race (the 
pairs were of either white women or African American women, to ac-
count for the influence of race on a motherhood bias), that differed only 
by parental status, they judged the mothers pairs as “significantly less 
competent and committed than women without children.”180 The judg-
ments about the women’s competence varied not only by parental sta-
tus, but also by gender: the study subjects recommended lower starting 
salaries for mothers, but not for fathers.181 The mothers were held to 
higher performance standards, and they were given less leeway with 
respect to punctuality than was given either to fathers or non-parents of 
either gender.182 A companion study, measuring the judgments of actual 
employers rather than study subjects, found that childless women were 
twice as likely to be called back for further interviews than mothers, 
despite nearly identical resumes. 183 The differing perceptions extend 
beyond assessments of competence. One study found that professional 
working women who became mothers were perceived as being more 
warm, but less competent, than women without children and men with 
children.184 Professional working fathers, in contrast, were perceived as 
both warmer and more competent after becoming parents.185 Subjects in 
the study were less interested in hiring, promoting or training the pro-
fessional women who became mothers compared to the fathers and 
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childless workers.186 Researchers in other studies have found similar 
effects—mothers are evaluated more harshly and treated with less leni-
ence than fathers,187 and working mothers suffer a per-child wage pen-
alty of about 5%.188 
This more nuanced understanding of bias is important when ask-
ing, as we will in the next section, whether pregnancy should be accom-
modated in the workplace. Accommodation often turns on an employer’s 
assessment of a worker’s—or class of workers’—value, and the findings 
on animus towards pregnant women and mothers in the workplace 
might help explain the reticence of employers to make special rules for 
pregnant women or even to extend otherwise available benefits to them. 
If they occupy a secondary status as workers, they are likely to be 
viewed as less worthy to retain—and thus less necessary to accommo-
date. The nature of pregnancy animus also raises questions relative to 
Part II.a and the scope of protection under the first clause of the PDA. 
The unique gender ideology behind pregnancy makes much of antidis-
crimination law a potentially bad fit, as it increasingly turns on a plain-
tiff’s ability to prove ill-intent of a bad actor.189 
C. Expanding from Preventing Bias to Providing Accommodation 
One might describe the last thirty-eight years of pregnancy dis-
crimination law as a slow march from access to integration. As detailed 
in Part I, the PDA responded to a regime that sometimes literally 
walled off pregnant women from other workers; the workplace was an 
array of closed doors. Congress sprung open those doors with its man-
date in the first clause of the PDA that employers could not make deci-
sions because of pregnancy.190 And, as discussed in Part II.a, more doors 
have opened as courts have extended the definition of pregnancy to in-
clude, at least sometimes, contraceptive access, infertility, and lactation. 
But as we saw in the discussion of those issues, while courts have been 
relatively quick to hold that employers cannot discriminate against 
women because they are currently engaged in any aspect of the repro-
ductive process that is unique to women, they have been more reticent 
to require employers to accommodate the effects of that process. Status-
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based protection opens doors, but accommodation of effects helps keep 
women in the workplace as full participants. 
The simplistic beauty of the First Clause of the PDA provides real, 
meaningful protection for a pregnant woman’s right to work, as long as 
she can perform her job on the same terms as she did when not preg-
nant or as required by her employer. But the protection breaks down 
when pregnancy has effects that interfere with job performance. If preg-
nancy or childbirth is fully incapacitating for a period of time, the wom-
an is thrust into the uncertain world of leave from work. She may have 
the luxury of working for an employer that provides paid leave or short-
term disability insurance. Or she may have access to unpaid leave (with 
guaranteed job security and the continuation of benefits) under the fed-
eral Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), a gender-neutral law that 
provides eligible employees with up to twelve weeks unpaid leave per 
year for self care, family care, or new parenting.191 For a pregnant wom-
an, she can use self-care leave if complications of pregnancy amount to a 
“serious health condition;” this leave can be taken continuously or in-
termittently.192  Any remaining leave can be used for childbirth and 
newborn care.193 The FMLA has two serious drawbacks: (1) almost half 
of the workforce is not eligible for leave because they work for an em-
ployer with fewer than fifty employees or have not worked sufficient 
hours to qualify for leave;194 and (2) the leave is unpaid, and many 
workers cannot afford to take it.195 Efforts to expand the FMLA on the 
federal level have been persistent but unsuccessful, but states have be-
gun to fill the gap with laws that apply to smaller employers, extend the 
length of available leave, or offer some paid leave.196 
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What happens to women who are neither fully capable nor fully in-
capacitated by pregnancy? For many of them, they could continue to 
work uninterrupted with the benefit of minor accommodations. But this 
is where the PDA is at its weakest. There is no absolute right to accom-
modations for the physical effects of pregnancy, even when they pose no 
hardship or cost to the employer. The PDA guarantees equal treatment, 
not whatever treatment might facilitate the pregnant woman’s ability to 
remain employed during the reproductive process.197 Any right to ac-
commodation is defined by comparison to similarly situated groups. If 
the employer provides no accommodations, it can safely withhold them 
from pregnant workers who need them. As Judge Richard Posner wrote 
in a famous PDA case: 
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not, despite the urgings 
of feminist scholars . . . require employers to offer maternity 
leave or take other steps to make it easier for pregnant women 
to work . . . to make it as easy, say, as it is for their spouses to 
continue working during pregnancy. Employers can treat preg-
nant women as badly as they treat similarly affected but non-
pregnant employees.198 
At its best, the comparative right of accommodation is still lim-
ited.199 It can be hard to find appropriate comparators,200 and disparate 
impact provides only limited protection against strict and unforgiving 
employer policies.201 But a more insidious problem developed over the 
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last two decades, during which several federal appellate courts began to 
curtail even the modest right of comparative right of accommodation. 
Courts almost unanimously gave the Second Clause of the PDA and 
unwarranted and narrow reading in order to uphold employer policies 
that provided accommodations to some employees, but not others, and 
refused them to employees with pregnancy-related effects. The most 
common policy upheld is one that grants light-duty assignments to 
workers injured on the job, but not to workers suffering from temporary 
disability attributable to any other cause. Such assignments are routine-
ly available in certain lines of work—firefighting, law enforcement, and 
truck driving, to name just a few. In all but one case, federal courts up-
held the on-the-job/off-the-job distinction against PDA challenges. 202 
These rulings were surprising, given the language in the Second Clause 
directing employers to draw comparisons based on capacity.203 
The battle for greater rights of accommodation piqued in a case in 
which a pregnant woman challenged a light-duty policy that was ex-
tended light-duty assignments widely, but still denied them to pregnant 
women.204 Peggy Young’s fight for the protection guaranteed by the PDA 
went all the way to the Supreme Court.205 
When Peggy Young finally became pregnant after a series of mis-
carriages, her doctor imposed a restriction on how much she could lift. 
At the time, she worked as an “air driver” for UPS, a delivery driver who 
carried lighter letters and packs for United Parcel Service that had ar-
rived by air.206 UPS decided that it could not continue to allow her to 
work unless she could lift the amount listed in her job description, even 
though she rarely if ever was asked to lift things that heavy.207 She re-
quested a light-duty assignment, but was denied, despite the fact that 
UPS made such accommodations available to three large groups of em-
ployees; those who were injured on the job, those who were eligible for 
an accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and those 
who had lost their commercial driver’s licenses due to a medical condi-
tion such as a diabetic complication or a legal condition such as the loss 
of a license after a drunk driving conviction.208 Young, however, was de-
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nied a similar accommodation.209 She was forced out of her job, lost her 
health insurance, and was allowed to return to work only after giving 
birth.210 
She sued under the PDA, arguing that UPS’s willingness to ac-
commodate so many other workers, but not pregnant women, constitut-
ed unlawful discrimination.211 Her case revolved around the meaning of 
the PDA’s Second Clause, which gives pregnant women the right to be 
treated the same as others who are “similar in their ability or inability 
to work,” but “not so affected” by pregnancy.212 At best, this clause gives 
workers only a comparative right of accommodation. But, even setting 
aside that limitation, courts have struggled for years over what this 
clause means and how to define the proper comparison group. This disa-
greement was at the heart of the Young case, as well as several other 
similar cases over the last several years.213 
Both the trial and appellate courts held that UPS had done nothing 
wrong because it did not exclude only pregnancy.214 As long as there 
were at least some temporarily disabled workers who might need an 
accommodation but not be entitled to one, UPS had not violated the 
PDA.215 The courts, especially the Fourth Circuit, picked up on a spe-
cious concept other courts had used in similar light-duty cases: pregnan-
cy-blindness.216 As long as the policy was not drawn precisely on the ba-
sis of pregnancy—and, indeed, appeared to be pregnancy-neutral, it 
could not violate the PDA.217 But in echoing this chorus, the Fourth Cir-
cuit admitted that the result would be to collapse the first and second 
clauses into a unified search for animus—employers need only ensure 
that they do not act “because of” pregnancy in order to avoid liability 
under the PDA.218 This reasoning, however, renders the Second Clause 
redundant, something conventional theories of statutory interpretation 
do not permit.219 
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Thus the question, as distilled by the Supreme Court, was whether 
pregnant workers were entitled to accommodations available to any oth-
er worker, to all other workers, or on the basis of some other compari-
son?220 Peggy Young argued that UPS’s policy was discriminatory be-
cause it permitted light-duty accommodations to some workers—
potentially many—who had similar types of work restrictions, but did 
not allow the same accommodation for her.221 Under the Second Clause 
of the PDA, she argued, UPS must grant her the same accommodations 
available to other workers with similar restrictions.222 UPS argued that 
no policy could violate the PDA if it was pregnancy-neutral—that is, if it 
did not single out pregnancy as the only condition that did not merit 
some particular accommodation.223 
Justice Breyer, who wrote the majority opinion, rejected both of 
these interpretations. With respect to Young’s, he rejected the idea that 
women were entitled to “most favored nation” status, which might enti-
tle them to demand an accommodation that was offered to any other 
worker.224 This, the majority wrote, was too broad a reading of the Se-
cond Clause. (At least Justice Alito, who otherwise took a more narrow 
approach to clause two, avoided the oddly abstract and impersonal 
“most favored nation” terminology and instead referred to “most favored 
employees.”)225 But UPS’s interpretation was too narrow—it would, as 
the Fourth Circuit more or less admitted, collapse the Second Clause 
into the first, in violation of an important principle of statutory con-
struction. And even more damningly, this reading would have allowed 
the employer’s policy in Gilbert—which covered all sicknesses and acci-
dents—to be upheld despite the incontrovertible fact that the PDA was 
enacted expressly to overrule that opinion.226 
The majority, instead, came up with a new approach to applying 
the Second Clause of the PDA, one that “minimizes the problems [of the 
parties’ interpretations], responds directly to Gilbert, and is consistent 
with longstanding interpretations of Title VII.”227 The Court’s approach 
relies on the so-called McDonnell-Douglas test, which is used to deter-
mine whether an employer’s ostensibly neutral reason for an action is 
actually pretextual, shielding an unlawful, discriminatory act. Under 
pretext analysis, a plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case by 
demonstrating that she was treated differently from someone similarly 
situated but outside the protected class.228 The district court in Young’s 
case had held that she failed at this stage because none of the proposed 
                                                       
220. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1348–49. 
221. See id. at 1349. 
222. See id. 
223. Id.   
224. Id. at 1350, 1362. 
225. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1358.  
226. Id. at 1352–53.  
227. Id. at 1353.  
228. Id. at 1353–54.  
2016 EXPANDING THE CORE: PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION 
LAW AS IT APPROACHES FULL TERM 
855 
 
comparators were “similarly situated”—she hadn’t been injured on the 
job, she did not qualify for ADA protection, and she hadn’t lost her 
commercial driver’s license.229 The court allowed the policy to be used in 
its own defense—an odd approach to discerning whether it was discrim-
inatory.  In its circular reasoning, Peggy Young was not similarly situ-
ated to anyone covered by the policy because she was not covered by the 
policy. 
Justice Breyer’s opinion saw through that silliness and provided 
instead that a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of pregnancy 
discrimination simply by showing that “she belongs to the protected 
class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not ac-
commodate her, and that the employer did accommodate others ‘similar 
in their ability or inability to work.’”230 This is a simple correction, but 
one that would have saved many pregnancy discrimination claims in the 
past.  But it is only one of the ways courts had found to prevent claims 
from reaching the next stage of analysis, let alone a trial.231 
Upon establishment of the prima facie case, the burden of produc-
tion then shifts to the employer, who must articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for its differential treatment.232 Here, the Court in 
Young added another rule to protect pregnancy discrimination plaintiffs. 
“[C]onsistent with the Act’s basic objective, that reason normally cannot 
consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to 
add pregnant women to the category of those (‘similar in their ability or 
inability to work’) whom the employer accommodates.”233 Indeed, the 
“employer in Gilbert could in all likelihood have made such a 
claim,”234and many restrictive, unfair policies could be justified in just 
those terms. 
After the employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for its treatment of the plaintiff, the plaintiff has the opportunity 
nonetheless to reach a jury by “providing sufficient evidence that the 
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employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, 
and that the employer’s ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory’ reasons are not 
sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather—when considered 
along with the burden imposed—give rise to an inference of intentional 
discrimination.”235 This is also a new addition to traditional pretext 
analysis, forcing employers to answer the real question underlying all 
these cases: why categorically exclude pregnant women from an accom-
modation that is provided to potentially large numbers of other work-
ers? 
Young could have prevailed on remand by showing that UPS does 
not have a sufficiently strong reason for refusing to accommodate preg-
nant employees with lifting restrictions while accommodating non-
pregnant employees with lifting restrictions—“to the point that a jury 
could find that its reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employ-
ees give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.”236 On re-
mand, Young and UPS settled the case for an undisclosed sum,237 so we 
will never know how a factfinder might have balanced those two things. 
But the Young opinion will continue to reverberate strongly in pregnan-
cy discrimination law. 
The opinion restored a role for comparative accommodation claims, 
which had been all but extinguished by a series of lower-court rulings 
that refused to give the Second Clause its due. But there are several is-
sues to be sorted out in the lower courts. For example, the Court reject-
ed the notion that pregnant women have a right to the accommodations 
extended to any other worker, but also the notion that the right is only 
triggered by an accommodation extended to all other workers.238 How 
many comparators does it take to support an inference of discrimina-
tion? The greater the number covered by the policy, the stronger the in-
ference that the exclusion of pregnancy from the policy is the product of 
discrimination. (Although the Court did not say so expressly, courts 
should base this comparison on the number of employees eligible for an 
accommodation under the policy rather than the number who have ac-
tually requested and been given an accommodation, which, in any given 
workplace, might be a null set). 
Perhaps the biggest open question after Young is what counts as a 
“legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” for not allowing pregnant work-
ers to make use of an otherwise available accommodation? The employer 
must do more than describe an exclusionary policy in pregnancy-neutral 
terms. That type of formalism, on display in Gilbert, is exactly what 
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Congress was repudiating with the PDA. And if, as the Court decrees, 
employers cannot excuse the failure to extend the accommodation to 
pregnant workers on grounds of additional cost or added administrative 
burdens, it is not entirely clear what will suffice. Even the General Elec-
tric policy in Gilbert, covering illness and accident, can be stated in 
pregnancy-neutral terms: the policy covers illness and accidents, and 
pregnancy does not qualify as either. But after Young, an employer will 
need a reasoned justification of the unfavorable treatment of pregnancy 
that does not discriminate against pregnancy as the source of the condi-
tion causing the work-related effects. The Young opinion suggests some 
cases in which this standard might be met—when accommodations are 
made available on the basis of age, seniority, or the hazardous nature of 
the employee’s work.239 An important question is whether the common-
place policies that grant accommodations only for on-the-job injuries will 
be upheld or invalidated after Young. Not all on-the-job injuries are the 
result of an ultrahazardous condition; many, in fact, have quite mun-
dane causes like a slip-and-fall in the hallway of an office building. And 
a blanket distinction between on- and off-the-job injuries seems to dis-
criminate on nothing more than source of condition, which is likely im-
permissible after Young. 
Young, and its somewhat unconventional use of McDonnell-
Douglas pretext analysis, is bound to raise other questions as well. The 
reason offered by the employer can be rebutted not only with proof that 
it was not genuine or legitimate, but also with proof that a genuine rea-
son isn’t “sufficiently strong” to justify the consequent burden on preg-
nant workers.”240 Although unusual, this use of pretext is a good fit with 
a core lesson of the PDA, which is that the disfavored treatment of 
pregnancy often rests on the devaluation of pregnant employees as fu-
ture mothers and unreliable workers, and the view that pregnant em-
ployees are not worth the same investments as other workers needing 
accommodations for other reasons. That devaluation is often expressed 
in the casual dismissal of the needs of pregnant women and insufficient 
concern whether they stay in the workforce or not. When employers 
draw distinctions that result in the accommodation of some workers, but 
not pregnant workers, courts should force employers to explain the basis 
for the policy—and should evaluate the explanation carefully. 
It is far too soon to evaluate Young’s contribution to pregnancy dis-
crimination law. On its face, the Young ruling seemed equipped to deal 
with the worst cases that had preceded it. Many of the cases in which 
courts upheld the denial of accommodations to pregnant workers would 
not survive scrutiny under the Young standard. But, as with all rulings 
in the discrimination context, the true scope of Young will not be known 
until enough lower courts have had the opportunity to apply it to differ-
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ent sets of facts. The early signs, however, are good. For example, in a 
recent case, McQuistion v. City of Clinton, the Supreme Court of Iowa 
applied basic PDA principles, as elucidated in Young, to vacate a grant 
of summary judgment to an employer and remand the case for deeper 
consideration of the facts related to the denial of an accommodation to a 
pregnant worker.241 (The claim was brought under the Iowa Civil Rights 
Act, but the court first decided that, at least on this point, Iowa law was 
consistent with the PDA as interpreted in Young).242 
Karen McQuistion was employed as an engineer for the City of 
Clinton’s fire department. She requested light-duty assignments during 
her pregnancy due to medical restrictions, but was denied because the 
light-duty positions were available only to those injured on the job and 
eligible for workers’ compensation benefits.243 
Although the employer denied McQuistion a benefit that was avail-
able to other workers, the lower court granted summary judgment to the 
city. The Iowa Supreme Court vacated that ruling and did just what the 
Supreme Court in Young envisioned: it remanded the case for a careful 
examination of the facts and circumstances. The City’s argument, “that 
the employer need not accommodate disability caused by pregnancy un-
less it falls within specifically defined categories singled out for accom-
modation,”244 could not prevail under Young. The policy of exclusion 
cannot be used to defend the policy of exclusion. The court thus also re-
jected the City’s argument that the proper comparators for McQuistion 
were only those workers who were also suffering from disability in-
curred off the job. On remand, she is to be compared with all temporari-
ly disabled workers.245 
This opinion does not establish any new ground, but it does show 
that Young is doing the work it was intended to do. That is shown in 
other post-Young cases as well, such as Martin v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, 
a case in which a woman’s PDA claim was remanded for trial because of 
disputed facts about the employer’s reasons for denying her an accom-
modation and about whether two other employees were proper compara-
tors.246 Together, these cases show that Young is forcing courts to slow 
down, think carefully about the challenged policy in front of them, ques-
tion employer motives for denying accommodations to pregnant women, 
and give pregnant workers the full benefit of the protections the law 
provides. This, alone, is important. 
The fight in light-duty cases, culminating in the Young opinion, 
was about something simple—giving the Second Clause of the PDA its 
due. But even when interpreted correctly, the PDA’s scope is limited. It 
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provides, at best, the accommodations that are available to other em-
ployees in the same workplace. That gives employers a lot of latitude to 
deny accommodations, even ones that are minor and costless, simply by 
denying them to everyone. Young did not—and could not—fix this prob-
lem. 
A recent case, Sanchez-Estrada v. Mapfre PRAICO, considered a 
complicated pregnancy discrimination claim, with many different is-
sues.247 But one illustrates the limited scope of the PDA. The plaintiff, 
among other complaints, stated that she had requested a maternity-fit 
uniform when she reached a certain point in her pregnancy.248 The em-
ployer refused to purchase one because it had exhausted its uniform 
budget for the year.249 It did allow her to wear regular clothing after she 
outgrew her regular uniform, but would not provide the accommodation 
she sought.250 A federal court in Puerto Rico held that the employer was 
under no obligation to provide the accommodation she sought because it 
had not provided a similar accommodation to anyone else.251 Now this 
might not seem like a compelling case, particularly as she was provided 
a different accommodation, but this same principle would apply in cases 
in which the failure to accommodate could result in the employee’s hav-
ing to resign or take unpaid leave. 
The lack of an absolute right of accommodation necessitates legisla-
tive action. Pregnant women should not have to rely on the whim or 
generosity of employers to gain the accommodations they might need to 
continue working, particularly when those accommodations can be made 
with little or no effort by the employer. 
Efforts have been made in the past couple of years to lobby for the 
Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA), a bill introduced into the 
House that promised to “eliminate discrimination and promote women’s 
health and economic security by ensuring reasonable workplace accom-
modations for workers whose ability to perform the functions of a job are 
limited by pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition.”252 Alt-
hough the ADA is complicated, its core revolves around a guarantee of 
reasonable accommodations for workers with disabilities as long as the 
accommodations do not impose an undue hardship on the employer.253 
PWFA makes the same promise—reasonable accommodations for the 
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physical effects of pregnancy, subject to an undue hardship limitation.254 
This would improve upon the PDA by mandating pregnancy accommo-
dations irrespective of whether the employer chooses to accommodate 
workers for any other reason. By way of feminist theory, PWFA draws 
on the accommodationist notions at play in Guerra, rooted in substan-
tive equality and a goal of ensuring that women who reproduce have the 
same opportunity to succeed at work as men who reproduce. 
PWFA is modeled on the Americans with Disabilities Act, which 
balances the employee’s need for an accommodation against the burden 
on the employer. If enacted, the PWFA would make it unlawful to: (1) 
refuse to “make reasonable accommodations to the known limitations 
related to the pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions of a 
job applicant or employee” without demonstrating “undue hardship” to 
the employer;255 (2) deny employment opportunities to a woman in order 
to avoid making required accommodations;256 (3) force a woman to ac-
cept an accommodation she does not want;257 and (4) force a woman to 
take leave “under any leave law or policy . . . if another reasonable ac-
commodation can be provided” instead.258 
Young was an important ruling, breaking up a disturbing pattern 
in which courts were refusing to give the PDA its intended scope. It set 
the stage for courts to look more closely at denials of accommodation, 
and the early evidence suggests that they are doing just that. But it 
didn’t, and couldn’t, extend the scope of the PDA, which is the obvious 
next step. 
D. Expanding the Sources of Pregnancy Discrimination Law 
One of the key shifts in pregnancy discrimination law has been 
from federal to state law. The gaps in federal law, particularly relating 
to accommodation rights, have been resistant to being filled. As noted 
above, the federal PWFA has been kicking around Capitol Hill for sev-
eral years now, but has never made it to the floor for a vote in either 
house. If passed, this bill would provide important protections, especial-
ly because it is modeled on ADA, which has been given new life by Con-
gress with amendments in 20008 designed to restore protections the 
Supreme Court had slowly destroyed and create new protections.259 
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The Congressional stalemate that has defined so much of the last 
decade has made PWFA’s passage a remote possibility at best. But 
states have begun to fill the void. California led the way by amending its 
Fair Employment and Housing Act in 1999 to respond to three specific 
gaps in federal pregnancy discrimination law.260 First, it requires em-
ployers to provide “reasonable accommodation for an employee for condi-
tions related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” if 
requested based on a doctor’s advice.261 This provision allows a pregnant 
woman who needs frequent bathroom breaks, for example, to obtain 
them. Second, the law prohibits employers from excluding pregnant 
women from any policy providing light-duty assignments (“less strenu-
ous or hazardous”) to other temporarily disabled employees.262 Although 
enacted long before the Supreme Court would consider this issue under 
the PDA, it goes further than Young by allowing pregnant workers with 
restrictions to access a light-duty assignment that is made available to 
any other employee.263 Finally, even in the absence of a light-duty policy, 
the law prohibits an employer from refusing a pregnant woman’s medi-
cally supported request for a transfer to light-duty “where that transfer 
can be reasonably accommodated.”264 There are other states that man-
date accommodations for pregnant workers under narrower circum-
stances.265 New York is the most recent state to join the parade, adopt-
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ing a reasonable accommodation law for pregnancy as part of Governor 
Andrew Cuomo’s Women’s Equality Act, adopted in 2015.266 New York 
City had adopted such a law on the local level, and perhaps that demon-
strated the ease with which such a minimal protection could be imple-
mented.267 And before that law took effect, it was clear that women 
lacked even the most minimal protections necessary to have equal op-
portunity in the workplace. 
A case before the local law was enacted is a good example of the 
senseless limitations faced by some pregnant workers. This was a case 
of exquisitely bad timing. Akema Thompson, an officer with the New 
York City Police Department, was scheduled to take the sergeant’s exam 
on October 19, 2013.268 But she had another appointment that day—in 
the maternity ward, to give birth to her first baby.269 Since only one of 
those appointments might be moved by request, Officer Thompson re-
quested an accommodation from the city; she asked to take the exam on 
the day reserved for other people with conflicts.270 Her request was de-
nied, even though promotional exams were routinely rescheduled for a 
long list of other reasons.271 
Officer Thompson filed a charge of discrimination against the City 
of New York, alleging that the testing accommodation policy, adminis-
tered by the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS), 
was unlawful as applied to her.272 Her case was typical in that she was 
denied a minor and costless accommodation; it was worse than most be-
cause the particular accommodation she sought was routinely extended 
to other workers whose circumstances posed less insurmountable con-
flicts.273 She was a victim of disregard, by a system that simply didn’t 
consider women, at least pregnant women, worthy of accommodating. 
Officer Thompson filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging denial of her 
requested accommodation constitutes sex, pregnancy, and disability dis-
crimination. In her charge, she detailed the request she made and the 
various responses she received from DCAS.274 This agency regulates and 
                                                                                                                                
cause of pregnancy and requiring transfer to a light-duty position upon medical necessity if 
one is available). 
266. New York Governor Cuomo Signs Women’s Equality Agenda, NAT’L L. REV. 
(Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-york-governor-cuomo-signs-
women-s-equality-agenda-new-law-strengthens-equal-pay; see also N.Y. HUMAN RTS. L. 
§§292(21-e, 21-f), 296(3) (McKinney’s 2016). 
267. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (22) (2016) (effective Jan. 2014). 
268. Affidavit of AkemaThompson, Akema Thompson v. City of New York at 3-15 
(filed with EEOC Mar. 17, 2014) (on file with author) (hereinafter Affidavit of Akema 
Thompson). 
269. Id. at 5. 
270. Id. at 9. 
271. Id. at 13–14. 
272. Id. at 21.  
273. Affidavit of AkemaThompson, supra note 268, at 14. Other accommodations 
were made for military duty, DCAS error, required court attendance, physical disability 
incurred on the job or absence related to the death of a close relative. Id.  
274. Id. at 3–20.  
2016 EXPANDING THE CORE: PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION 
LAW AS IT APPROACHES FULL TERM 
863 
 
administers testing for all city jobs – not just those at the NYPD.275 
Thus, the NYPD was not responsible for the denial of Officer Thomp-
son’s request. Although her case was ultimately settled, the EEOC 
charge appended copies of the written correspondence back and forth 
between Thompson and DCAS regarding her request for an accommoda-
tion.276 
In January 2013, Officer Thompson learned that the city had 
scheduled a sergeant’s promotional exam for the following October.277 
Although this might seem like a routine event, these exams are sched-
uled only “as needed” and can be spaced apart by several years.278 Of-
ficer Thompson immediately paid almost $800 to a test prep company 
for a review course.279 The next month, she became pregnant and in-
formed the NYPD of her condition shortly thereafter.280 Her due date 
was, as mentioned above, the exact same day as the exam.281 
In June 2013, Officer Thompson registered for the exam, paying an 
additional $83.282 Because of the conflict with her due date, she contact-
ed DCAS to request that she be allowed to take the exam on another 
day.283 She provided medical documentation of her due date and the 
number of weeks she would need to recover medically from childbirth.284 
She requested the accommodation numerous times both in writing and 
over the phone.285 In one of these communications, Officer Thompson 
mentioned that the NYPD had told her to request to take the exam on 
an alternative testing day already set aside for those whose religious 
observances conflicted with the scheduled date.286 
The request for accommodation was flatly denied.287 She was told, 
in one piece of correspondence, that her “request to postpone this test 
due to the possibility that you may give birth on, or shortly after the test 
date, is not approvable.”288 In another e-mail, she was informed that city 
policy does allow the promotional exam to be rescheduled, but only for 
conflicts due to (1) military duty, (2) DCAS error, (3) required court ap-
pearance (in any type of proceeding), (4) physical disability incurred on 
the job, or (5) the death of a close relative.289 She was also told in other 
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correspondence that tests could be rescheduled to accommodate reli-
gious observance.290 
Three days before her due date, Officer Thompson went into la-
bor.291 She was hospitalized that day, October 16.292 While in labor, she 
received a telephone call from a representative at DCAS, who reiterated 
that she could not postpone the test because of childbirth, but the repre-
sentative did offer her a cushion to sit on during the exam and two addi-
tional hours to complete it.293 Neither a cushion nor extra time was go-
ing to make it possible for Officer Thompson to sit for the sergeant’s ex-
am.294 She had an emergency C-section on October 16 and was not re-
leased from the hospital until October 20, the day after the exam was 
given.295 And while other candidates may well have taken the October 
2013 exam at later dates because of “approvable” conflicts, Officer 
Thompson was denied the opportunity. 
Had her situation occurred a year later, she would have been pro-
tected under New York City’s Pregnant Workers Fairness Act 
(PWFA).296 The local PWFA (distinguished from the proposed, but as-of-
yet-unenacted federal bill by the same name) applies to employers with 
at least four employees.297 The law requires employers to provide “rea-
sonable accommodation” necessitated by pregnancy or childbirth unless 
doing so would cause an “undue hardship” on the employer.298 The types 
of accommodations contemplated by the law include light-duty assign-
ments (e.g., one without heavy lifting); changes to the work setting (e.g., 
to avoid toxins); more frequent breaks to eat, drink, or use the bath-
room.299 
Officer Thompson was technically not covered by the law because it 
was enacted after her accommodation was denied, but the New York 
City Division of Human Rights, which implements antidiscrimination 
laws, has taken the position publicly that it considered pregnancy a dis-
ability even before this law took effect.300 Moreover, she should have 
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been granted the accommodation under the federal and state laws in 
existence at the time of her request. Even without the protection of local 
law, however, Thompson should have had a claim under the PDA, as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Young v. UPS.301 This would have 
been the perfect case to test the court’s benefits-versus-burdens analy-
sis. DCAS admits that it provides such accommodations to a wide varie-
ty of workers – including some with far less dire conflicts with the test 
than childbirth on the same day – while withholding them from preg-
nant officers.302 For example, it allows candidates to postpone the pro-
motional exam if a close relative has died within a week of the exam 
date.303 While this is a humane rule that correctly assumes officers need 
time to grieve and tend to the burial of a deceased relative, it is not clear 
that these officers could not or would not show up for the scheduled ex-
am if no alternative were given. But for Officer Thompson, both her pre-
dicted due date and her actual delivery date posed a direct and insur-
mountable conflict with the exam. She could not be in two places at once 
– a hospital maternity ward and an administrative testing room. 
In July 2015, New York City settled Thompson’s case for $50,000 in 
damages and the opportunity to take a makeup test.304 The City also 
promised, as part of the settlement, to pay Thompson’s legal fees and, 
more importantly, to change its policy to allow employees with pregnan-
cy- or childbirth-related disability to take makeup exams along with 
others eligible to do so.305 But her case is still instructive. Why did the 
original DCAS policy insist on the denial of a minor, costless, and broad-
ly available accommodation to pregnant state workers? The answer can 
only be in the undervaluing of women in the workforce. Although this 
particular accommodation did not relate to Officer Thompson’s ability to 
perform her existing job, it did prevent her from seeking a promotion. 
Had she done well on the exam and earned a promotion, wouldn’t the 
city be better off by advancing someone proven qualified for a higher 
position? And for many pregnant women, the refusal of minor accommo-
dation will affect their ability to carry out some aspects of an existing 
job. An employer’s refusal to accommodate in such a case can mean that 
the employee is forced to quit or take unpaid leave. (And because DCAS 
administers testing for all city jobs, its stingy accommodation policy cuts 
a wide swath.) While the most significant consequences will be borne by 
the employee, suddenly deprived of income and perhaps health insur-
ance, the employer will suffer as well in the costs of rehiring, retraining, 
and, perhaps, not replacing with the same quality employee. Employers 
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should be taken to task for their casual devaluation of women in their 
ranks. State pregnancy accommodation laws, of which there are now 
more than a dozen, will help correct this indifference to the needs of 
women during their reproductive years.306 
CONCLUSION 
A decade ago, there was little discussion of pregnancy discrimina-
tion law, an issue thought raised and resolved in the 1970s and 1980s, 
when the contours of Title VII were first hammered out. But as women 
became a normal and expected part of the workforce, the goals have 
shifted – from allowing them to be there to making them a full and inte-
grated part of the workforce. As the goals have shifted, efforts on the 
litigation and legislative fronts have shifted as well. The four key 
shifts—some realized, some a work in progress—reflects those changing 
efforts. Perhaps by the PDA’s fortieth year—like a fetus in its fortieth 
week—it will be fully formed and ready to go. 
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